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During the 1990s, the Federal Reserve has pursued its twin goals of
price stability and steady employment growth with considerable success.
But despite--or perhaps because of--this success, concerns about the
pace of economic and productivity growth have attracted renewed
attention. Many observers ruefully note that the average pace of GDP
growth has remained below rates achieved in the 1960s and that a period
of rapid investment in computers and other capital equipment has had
disappointingly little impact on the productivity numbers. Others see
faster growth as softening the impact of widening income inequality or
the stagnant real wages earned by many citizens.
Most of the industrial world has experienced a similar decline in
trend and productivity growth, an increase in income inequality, and
even slower job creation than we have seen here in the United States.
While some (particularly Asian) developing countries are rapidly join-
ing the ranks of the industrialized, most remain mired in poverty.
According to the World Bank’s recent report on poverty, over 20 per-
cent of the world’s population lives on less than one dollar a day. This
situation wastes human talent and contributes to political instability.
While raising trend growth rates would not directly address distri-
butional issues, increasing growth rates by even a fraction of 1 percent
would, with compounding, have profound implications. As Robert Lucas
has pointed out, "the consequences for human welfare are simply
staggering. Once one starts thinking about them, it is hard to think of
anything else." Unfortunately, economists and policymakers do not
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know how to engineer such an outcome. While the determinants of
growth are widely agreed to be capital, labor, and a composite including
managerial skills and organizational culture that Robert Solow abbrevi-
ated as "technology," the interrelationships among these variables are not
clearly understood. In the developed economies, at least, recent large
capital investments have shown surprisingly little positive impact on
productivity or potential growth. Accordingly, attention has increasingly
turned to the role of such intangibles as human capital, social organiza-
tion, and technology.
Because these puzzles are so compelling, the last few years have seen
a resurgence in research on the economics of growth. This groundswell
reflects the availability of new data bases and an improved ability to
model imperfectly competitive conditions. Primarily, however, this en-
thusiasm indicates that many members of the economics profession
concur with The Economist (June 1, 1996) that "understanding growth is
surely the most urgent task in economics." For these reasons, the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston devoted its fortieth economic conference, held in
June 1996, to Technology and Growth. We hoped to explore what we know
and clarify what we do not know about these issues.
A number of themes emerged from the discussions. For the most part
these themes took the shape of questions repeated in various contexts. For
example, one fundamental question asked throughout the meeting was
just how important is technology--to growth, to productivity, to conver-
gence? The answer, it was .generally agreed, depends on one’s definition
of technology, with the majority favoring an inclusive approach. Most
participants were sympathetic with the need to decompose technology
into its constituent parts--innovation, development, and diffusion--and
to include intangibles like organizational structure, management skills,
and culture in the package labeled technology. Another theme that arose
early on and reappeared throughout the conference was the unpredict-
able nature of technological change and the consequences of our uncer-
tainty (or lack of imagination) concerning its ultimate path.
A third motif involved the role of innovation and the importance of
knowledge-based spillovers within the growth process. While early work
based on Robert Solow’s model attributed most growth to exogenous
technological change, more recent neoclassical research, exemplified by
Dale Jorgenson’s work, has greatly reduced technology’s role by broad-
ening our definition and improving our measures of capital. Indeed,
Jorgenson concludes that human and physical capital accumulation,
properly measured, explains almost all growth with little scope for
innovation or knowledge-based spillovers.
But not everyone is fully persuaded that capital accumulation,
however defined, can by itself account for the great bulk of welfare
improvements experienced in recent decades. Noting a major inconsis-
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predicted by the neoclassical approach and the slower rate observed in
fact, the new growth theorists give technological change, rather than
capital, a bigger role in the growth process. They argue that technological
change requires human effort and is, therefore, not exogenous, that the
returns to R&D and other knowledge-based investments are not fully
appropriable, and that spillovers from innovation have contributed
importantly to growth. Naturally, thus, the new growth theorists stress
the need to model the innovative process and the role played by these
spillovers. While participants of both camps generally favored develop-
ing fully endogenous models, they disagreed about our current or
potential ability to meet this challenge and, more basically, about its
actual importance. In this regard, most, but not all, of the participants
believe that spillovers are pervasive and significant.
A further theme was the need to be realistic in at least two areas.
First, we need to acknowledge that potential growth may not return to its
pace in the 1960s and that we may have to be satisfied with raising the
level of output rather than the rate of growth. Economists also need to
admit how little we understand about the growth process and how small
are the likely consequences of the policy measures we advocate.
The conferees did agree on several points. Since the previous heyday
of growth economics in the late 1950s, economists have greatly improved
their ability to model the growth process by broadening their definitions
and measures of physical and human capital. This development has
reduced the role of exogenous technological change and narrowed the
differences between the neoclassical and new growth theorists. Remain-
ing areas for dispute and research include the need for modeling the
various components of technology and the interactions between the
determinants of growth and the growth process itself. Moreover, al-
though research has not clearly demonstrated that the technology em-
bodied in widely available capital equipment has much impact on
productivity, participants generally concurred that technology defined
to include management, social organization, and culture is likely to be
important.
As for policy recommendations, conference participants largely
agreed that the path of technical development and diffusion is highly
unpredictable. Given this uncertainty and the gap between the social and
private returns to R&D, most participants favored modest and balanced
public support of basic research and other pro-competitive policies. They
were less convinced about the benefits of the patent system.
On the macro side, participants universally endorsed the need to
reduce fiscal deficits in order to promote saving and investment and the
desirability of maintaining open trading systems in order to spur inno-
vation. Several attendees advocated greater use of consumption-based
tax systems. Many also saw an ongoing need for government investment
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statistical capabilities. Monetary policy’s contribution was generally seen
to be limited to maintaining price stability, but Bob Solow reminded us
that balancing relatively tight fiscal policy with relatively accommodative
monetary policy tends to favor growth. He also noted that below-
potential growth discourages investment and innovation. Finally, if
increasing productivity growth remains out of reach, some participants
saw a need for more generous redistributive policies.
KEYNOTE ADDRESS: THE NETWORKED BANK
In his keynote address, Robert M. Howe provided an intriguing
view of how one industry--financial services--has responded to rapid
technological change, and a vision of how that industry will be trans-
formed with the introduction of technologies already in the development
pipeline. Howe’s vision is that of the networked economy: "the integra-
tion of people and institutions obtaining information, transacting busi-
ness, and entertaining and educating themselves in a connected world,
with electronic networks as the underlying backbone." In addition to
detailing the modifications required of banks to survive in this networked
environment, Howe shows where consumers fit into this system.
The networked bank has three components. The first component
includes the access channels that link the consumer to the bank--ATMs,
telephones, PCs, and bank tellers. Control over these channels rests in
the hands of consumers and of third-party providers, such as on-line
services. The second component is the "customer information and
relationship management system," the bank’s data base tracking cus-
tomer activities to glean information about customer preferences. Howe
suggests that effective use of this information--to tailor products to
individual consumers or to determine the bank’s most profitable market
segments--will become the bank’s "most valued asset and source for
competitive advantage." The third component of the networked bank is
the "core back-office system," which coordinates the operational systems,
retail and commercial banking functions, and alliances with other service
providers--for example, insurance firms or trav61 agents--that offer their
services through the bank.
Howe forecasts the emergence and widespread distribution of a suite
of new technologies that will Support the networked bank. These include
improved communications interfaces, such as speech and handwriting
recognition; three-dimensional, high-resolution graphics; and touch
screens. Network infrastructure will improve rapidly in speed and price,
and user-screening and encryption will enhance security. In addition,
the continued miniaturization of processor and storage technology will
allow smart cards with PC capabilities for financial transactions, in-
ventory control, or transmission of medical patient information. "Intelli-
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example, "Go find me the lowest-priced Brand X automobile with the
following features." Finally, networked banks will make greater use of
new tools for data management, to analyze customers and transactions
for targeted marketing campaigns.
These changes in the competitive environment pose new challenges
to banks. Because the provision of a service will often involve a number
of players, banks must establish "electronic value chains" that link the
bank, the customer, perhaps a vendor, and a network infrastructure
provider. Howe foresees a notable shift of power from banks to consum-
ers and providers of access channels. With easy access to many options,
a consumer may have little loyalty to a particular financial institution.
A bank will need to differentiate its product from its easily accessible
competitors, even when its product may appear only as a menu item on
a screen. The bank’s most valuable asset will shift from its branches, the
current interface with its customers, to its customer data base and its
expertise in extracting useful information from that data base.
How can the networked bank respond to these challenges? Howe
¯ proposes three possible strategies. The first, the "customer-centric" strat-
egy, uses the bank’s customer data base and data base analysis to serve
each customer with unique, customized services. A second response is
the "life-event" strategy: The bank becomes the provider of a cluster of
services required by the consumer at key life events, such as buying a
house or planning for retirement. A third option is the commodity
strategy, in which the bank competes by providing standardized services
through a wide range of access channels at the lowest cost.
Finally, Howe points out that these technological advances pose
difficult questions for financial regulators. For example, does a global
electronic financial system imply greater systemic risk to the payments
system? How are standards of security and reliability established for new
products? Will new clearinghouse organizations be required for new
products? How are consumers to be protected if non-regulated industries
can offer bank-like services? Who guards the consumer’s right to privacy?
TECHNOLOGY IN GROWTH THEORY
Dale Jorgenson’s paper traces the economics profession’s under-
standing of technology and economic growth from the seminal works
of Harrod (1939), Domar (1946), Solow (1956), and Kuznets (1971) to the
more recent "endogenous growth models" of Grossman and Helpman
(1994). In Jorgenson’s view, the profession formed a rare and temporary
consensus in the 1970s around the neoclassical growth model of Solow
and the empirical work of Kuznets. Solow’s simple theoretical frame-
work, which decomposed contributions to output according to a con-
stant-returns-to-scale production function with capital and labor as
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plementary work linking measures of capital and labor inputs ~to final
output provided "persuasive empirical support" for the neoclassical
growth model by documenting the correlation among inputs and outputs
for the United States and 13 other developed countries over a long
historical span. What stands out most for Jorgenson about these twin
pillars of early growth theory, theoretical and empirical, is the lack of
integration between them.
In early implementations of the Solow growth model, growth arose
primarily as a result of increases in productivity. Because the reasons
behind productivity increases were not understood; most economic
growth was attributed to exogenous causes that largely reflected, as
Abramovitz (1956) phrased it, a "measure of our ignorance." The con-
tribution of investment in physical and human capital was assumed to
be relatively minor.
Work by Jorgenson and others in the 1980s has attempted to
diminish our ignorance by using carefully constructed measures of the
inputs to production in an econometric model. The product of this
research strategy is a model that fully characterizes the accumulation of
human and physical capital and attributes almost all of economic growth
to increases in the rate of capital accumulation, once properly measured.
A truly satisfactory model of endogenous investment in new technology
has eluded the profession thus far, however, in large .part because of the
difficulties inherent in measuring the output of the research and devel-
opment sector (a problem .first identified by Griliches in 1973).
Interest in growth theory waned in the 1970s, in the aftermath of the
oil price shocks and a renewed ~attention to the determinants of business
cycle fluctuations, but the debate over "convergence" in the 1980s and
early 1990s revived interest, even as it challenged the validity of the
Solow framework. Because the convergence debate focused on the
long-run growth experience of nations, it brought to light a key question
that had not previously been addressed: Could private investment,
whose returns accrue only to the investor, account for the leaps and
bounds in output that some countries have observed over centuries? Or
do we need "spillovers" in "knowledge capital,;’ which may result from
individuals’ investment but which benefit all, to explain growth over long
spans of time?
Jorgenson describes the essence of the convergence debate as fol-
lows: If Solow’s model is approximately correct, then over a long enough
period of time, a country will converge to its "steady state" or long-run
rate of per capita income growth, which is determined by its saving and
population growth rates. The Solow model predicts that the rate of
convergence to the steady state will depend upon the share of capital in
GDP, the rate of population growth, the rate of productivity growth, and
the rate of depreciation of capital equipment. Using plausible estimates
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about 4 percent per year. While empirical studies have found evidence
of convergence, the estimated rate of convergence--about 2 percent per
year--is too slow to be consistent with the Solow model.
An influential paper by Paul Romer (1986) highlights the inconsis-
tency between the simple Solow model and the evidence on rates of
convergence. Romer deduced that, for the slow observed rates of conver-
gence to be consistent with the Solow model, the share of national income
devoted to capital accumulation must be about twice as large as normally
assumed. The reasoning is as follows: The larger is the share of national
income devoted to capital accumulation, the more investment is required
to increase output; the more investment is required, the slower will be the
convergence to the steady state for a given investment rate.
Because doubling the share of income going to investment is just a
"crazy explanation" of the slow-convergence puzzle, Romer and others
suggest what they consider to be more plausible alterations to the
standard growth model, such as increasing returns to scale in the
aggregate production function, and spillovers of the returns to private
investment to the rest of the economy. In their view, only these alterations
can reconcile the standard growth model with the convergence data.
Mankiw, David Romer, and Weil (1992) find, however, that Paul
Romer’s crazy explanation is unnecessary and the Solow model can be
resurrected once one controls for differences in human capital across
countries. Allowing for these differences again reconciles the basic Solow
model with the share of capital in the value of output and with the slow
rates of convergence observed over time across countries.
A recent paper by Islam (1995) extends this work, allowing for
different levels of productivity across countries. Islam’s work shows that
once one accounts for differences in the level of productivity, the Solow
model captures well the endogenous accumulation of physical capital,
without any need to account for the accumulation of human capital. Islam
suggests human capital’s contribution to changes in growth may not be as
evident because it changes so slowly: While physical capital may com-
pletely adjust to changes in tax policy in a matter of decades, human
capital may require a century to respond to changes in educational policy!
Despite this evidence, Jorgenson continues, the proposition that
private investment in physical and human capital is a more important
source of growth than productivity remains as controversial today as it
was in the early 1970s. Jorgenson believes that he has largely resolved this
issue, however, with a perfectly competitive, constant-returns-to-scale
neoclassical model that employs constant-quality indexes of both labor
and capital input and investment goods output. The complete economet-
ric model developed over many years by Jorgenson and his colleagues
attributes fully 83 percent of growth to the endogenous changes in capital
and labor inputs, with the remaining 17 percent accounted for by
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the attribution of growth from that of Solow who found that only 12.5
percent of growth in per capita output could be attributed to capital
accumulation (he did not consider human capital).
Discussant Susanto Basu assesses the success of the Jorgenson (and
coauthors) research program according to its ability to explain three
"fundamental questions of growth theory": (1) Why does per capita in-
come increase over time? (2) Why are some countries rich and others
poor? (3) Why has economic growth slowed down in developed
countries?
With regard to the first question, Basu points out that Jorgenson
treats technology as knowledge, which is a form of capital and behaves
just like any other capital. The New Growth theory, by contrast, believes
that the knowledge that propels technological advance differs from other
capital in one crucial aspect: "Investors cannot fully internalize the
benefits from accumulating knowledge." The presence of strong spill-
overs from private investment in knowledge can imply significant
differences in the answers that Jorgensonian and New Growth theories
give to the first question. The Jorgensonian rendering implies that in the
very long run, no growth in per capita income can occur, since growth
arises only from capital accumulation, and the marginal product of
capital must diminish as capital accumulates. By contrast, the New
Growth theory implies that the long-run growth rate of the economy will
depend on the rate of accumulation of "knowledge" capital. Jones (1995)
provides compelling evidence against the latter hypothesis for the United
States and other advanced economies. Taking the inherent plausibility
of knowledge spillovers together with Jones’s evidence, Basu favors an
intermediate position with modest spillovers, consistent with the Jones
evidence and with the Jorgenson position.
The work of Islam (1995) highlights a deficiency in Jorgenson’s
approach with respect to the second question, namely that differences
across countries in income per worker cannot be explained by differences
in capital per worker, as required by the Jorgenson model. That is,
countries’ production functions cannot be the same. To explain income
differences, we require another factor of production that varies across
locations, perhaps a factor that involves differences in the diffusion of
technology or the degree of infrastructure in place, and thus drives a
wedge between technological change and productivity.
Could this wedge also explain the observed slowdown (since the
early 1970s) in productivity in advanced countries? Basu suggests that
it may. Usin8 the methods of Basu and Fernald (1995), he presents
estimates showing that only a small portion of the slowdown in produc-
tivity growth can be attributed to a reduction in the growth rate of
technology. Basu suggests that changes in the allocation of inputs across
sectors may account for the bulk of the productivity slowdown. He
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power of the neoclassical model augmented by careful measurement. He
believes, however, that the model will need to be amended to allow for
some spillover effects.
Discussant Gene Grossman focuses on four key questions about the
role of technology in growth theory. First, "Is technological progress
needed to sustain growth?" Grossman notes that, technically, our econ-
omy could grow indefinitely without technological enhancements if we
continue to invest in physical and human capital and if the returns to
doing so always remain above a minimum level. However, he suggests
that long-run growth with such static technology is implausible. In the
presence of factors in fixed supply, such as land and fuels, capital must
eventually experience severely diminishing returns.~ Would the world
economy have evolved as it has over the past 200 years in the absence of
all the innovations introduced in that period--without steam engines,
electricity, or semiconductors? Adding more and more shovels and
horses would not have allowed us to reach today’s level of output. A role
for technology in long-run growth seems mandatory.
A second question is whether innovation represents the product of
intentional activity and is thus "endogenous" to the economy, or not.
Grossman suggests that innovation is endogenous; the firms that spend
in excess of $100 billion on R&D must be doing so for a reason. He also
cites the evidence in Baumol that innovations vary across history in
response to variation in incentives facing innovators.
Third, Grossman asks whether "formal" R&D is responsible for the
bulk of technological progress. The evidence presented by Jones (1995)
suggests not: The long-run surge in R&D activity in the postwar period
has not been accompanied by equal surges in the growth of per capita
output, and the decline in productivity since 1973 does not seem to be
explained by declining R&D (Griliches 1988). Perhaps this mismatch of
R&D and output growth reflects a focus on the use of "formal" R&D,
which may not measure efforts to improve manufacturing processes or
organizational structures, or, more generally, to innovate at the margin.
Finally, Grossman asks whether the market-determined level of R&D
investment is socially optimal. The answer to this question depends upon
the existence of knowledge "spillovers": Knowledge gained from one
firm’s investment makes research more productive for other firms, while
the other firms need not compensate the originating firm for this
knowledge. When spillovers exist, the social returns to investing, which
include the returns to those who did not pay for the investment, exceed
the private returns. Jorgenson is skeptical of the existence of such
spillovers, but Grossman reads the bulk of the empirical evidence as
pointing to social returns to R&D investment that are more than twice as
large as private returns. Does the presence of excess social returns suggest
an investment tax credit or subsidy to foster innovative activity? Not
necessarily; as Mansfield (1986) points out, R&D tax credits often encour-10 Jeffrey C. Fuhrer and Jane Sneddon Little
age firms to relabel existing activities as investment, rather than to
undertake new research.
Grossman acknowledges the important contributions of the neoclas-
sical framework, favored by Jorgenson, to growth theory. However, he
points out limitations of the model that make it "not well suited for
studying innovation": The neoclassical model assumes constant returns
to scale and perfect competition. Investment in knowledge, on the other
hand, requires large up-front fixed costs that imply increasing returns to
scale, and pricing in excess of marginal costs to recover high fixed costs,
in violation of the assumptions of perfect competition. Thus, Grossman
feels, one must study innovation in a setting that allows for imperfect
competition, even when this makes policy prescriptions more difficult.
UNCERTAINTY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
Nathan Rosenberg examines the relationship between uncertainty,
technological change, and economic growth. Rosenberg’s approach to the
topic is, he admits, anecdotal; but he discusses many of the most
important innovations of this century, demonstrating the influence of
uncertainty for technologies that have had tremendous economic impact.
Many of Rosenberg’s primary conclusions are exemplified in his
study of the laser. The laser currently has dozens of applications, from
producing CDs to enabling delicate eye surgery, from an essential
instrument in chemical research to the rapid carrier of data, voice, and
optical information across telecommunications lines. And yet the initial
developers of the laser at Bell Labs not only could not foresee these
applications, but did not think the invention worthy of a patent applica-
tion, since "such an invention had no possible relevance to the telephone
industry." This lack of foresight was not a malady unique to the
telecommunications industry or to potential users of lasers; the same
inability to predict the general usefulness of an invention, let alone its
particular uses, extends to the developers of the telephone, the computer,
the transistor, the jet engine, and the radio.
What categories of uncertainty make it so difficult to foresee the
usefulness of innovations? Rosenberg catalogues several. First, new
technologies arrive on the scene with characteristics that do not immedi-
ately or obviously lend themselves to application. For example, new
techniques for visualization in medicine, such as CAT scanners and
magnetic resonance imagers (MRIs), were developed before it was known
how to interpret their output in a clinically useful fashion. Significant
additional research was required to render the innovation not only
technically feasible but also usable by doctors and technicians in making
diagnoses.
A second class of uncertainty arises when the success of invention A
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not exist at the time invention A is introduced. Take, for example, the use
of lasers in communications. Only upon the development of fiber optics,
and upon understanding how laser light could be transmitted through
fiber optic cable, did lasers become a viable communications medium.
When the success of the innovation depends upon a system of comple-
mentary innovations, as may be the case with computer technology, the
length of the gestation period from inception to a full menu of uses may
be decades.
A third class of uncertainty arises because many inventions were
designed to solve very specific problems. For example, British engineers
invented the steam engine in the eighteenth century to pump out flooded
mines. The possibility that such an engine could be used in entirely
different industries, for transportation or power generation for manufac-
turing, became evident only after many decades, during which time a
sequence of improvements were made to the initial invention.
Finally, Rosenberg identifies uncertainty about the marketability of
an invention. As he puts it, inventions need "to pass an economic test, not
just a technological one." When Marconi invented the radio, he did not
possess David Sarnoff’s vision of a new medium "to transmit news,
music, and other forms of entertainment and information into every
household in the country." Without someone to anticipate and champion
the commercial possibilities of the technology, the radio might have gone
the way of the buggy whip.
In concluding, Rosenberg draws out the policy implications of the
almost overwhelming uncertainty involved in technological innovation.
First, he suggests that the increased emphasis on the "relevance" of
research to social and economic needs is misplaced; we cannot know
which research or development will turn out to be relevant, or relevant to
what! For the same reasons, the government should not attempt tc
support a single technological approach to a problem, or one narrow area
of research. These caveats do not necessarily apply to the private sector,
however. In the face of uncertainty, Rosenberg asserts, the market will ot
its own accord encourage individual firms to pursue a wide array ot
research strategies, which, given uncertainty, is more likely to produce a
useful innovation.
Joel Mokyr is largely sympathetic to Rosenberg’s characterization ot
the uncertainty (or perhaps ignorance) facing decision-makers, but he
suggests a modest reinterpretation. First, Mokyr posits two levels ot
uncertainty in technological change, the firm’s micro-uncertainty, and the
economy’s macro-uncertainty. The former comprises a host of firm-level
questions: Can this particular technical problem be solved? Can this firm
solve it? Will we arrive at the answer first? Will it sell or sell profitably?
At the macro level, uncertainty involves which technological regim~
will dominate: nuclear or fossil fuels? Both levels of uncertainty figur~
prominently in the decisions of potential innovators.12 Jeff~rey C. Fuhrer and Jane Sneddon Little
Mokyr poses an analogy between evolutionary biology and techno-
logical innovation. The analogy holds in two regards. First, innovations,
like mutations, occur at least somewhat randomly, and thus we do not
know in advance what the future supply of innovations will look like.
The degree of randomness likely differs between biology and technology,
as the latter presumably attempts to respond to economic need. However,
Mokyr and Rosenberg agree that while the correlation between need and
mutation "may not be zero, it is not very high either."
Second, we do not well understand the "laws" that determine
whether a particular mutation will be selected or not, in the biological case
by natural selection, and in the case of technology by the market. Success
in many instances depends on luck; Mokyr points out that 70 percent of
all new products that make it to the distribution stage disappear again
within 12 months. This high mortality rate underscores the poverty of
knowledge, even among the innovators themselves, about the laws that
determine which innovations will be successful.
Mokyr adds a third "evolutionary" process that is germane to
understanding the uncertainty in innovation: the evolution of economic
institutions. As Douglass North (1990) has emphasized, institutions
evolve in a way that is no more predictable than the evolution of science
and technology.
But the situation is even more complex, as the sources not only
evolve but c0evolve. Many institutions--free labor markets, enforced
property rights--are good for technological development, whereas
others--uncertain property rights, totalitarian government--clearly are
not. Modern innovators need to know how the institutional climate will
be when they bring their product to market. Will the FDA approve
it? Will I get sued? Will it pass environmental restrictions? Only as
institutions friendly to innovation evolve with technology will technol-
ogy succeed.
Mokyr concludes with reference to a final biological/technological
debate, between "adaptationists" and "anti-adaptationists." Do technol-
ogy and living species adapt so that we see only efficient technological
and biological outcomes, or do important examples exist of innovations
(mutations) that are clearly suboptimal and persistent? Is the dominance
of the Qwerty keyboard a result of inefficient lock-in and path-depen-
dence, or do we not properly understand its inherent efficiency? Mokyr
declines to take a firm stance on this issue, but notes a difference between
the biological and technology versions of the debate. The biological
adaptation debate involves a more constrained evolutionary process:
A species can adapt or become extinct. Technology is somewhat less
constrained; societies can, at least in principle, adopt a completely
different technology very rapidly, albeit at significant private and social
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costs of not changing? If not, another role for the government may be to
spur such changes when private benefits fall short of total social benefits.
Luc Soete cautions against drawing broad conclusions from the
anecdotal evidence presented by Rosenberg. The innovations chosen by
Rosenberg may have sparked the interest of historians precisely because
they had such unanticipated success; if so, they may not be truly
representative. Soete also suggests that sectors vary greatly in the type
of uncertainty facing their research efforts. A drug firm that pursues
hundreds of leads on a trial and error basis faces a different kind and
magnitude of uncertainty from a chip manufacturer that is developing
the next generation that will double processing speed.
Soete questions whether omnipresent uncertainty could explain the
productivity slowdown. Do the productivity gains that we expect from,
for example, information processing technologies, seem to lag their in-
vention because of the difficulties in identifying their most efficient
uses? "You ain’t seen nothin’ yet" is the optimistic buzz-phrase of this
explanation.
Soete proposes two other equally plausible explanations of the
"missing productivity." The first is the difficulty inherent in measuring
the output of information goods and services. As suggested by Nakamura
(1995), the failure to properly capture the consumer surplus generated by
the vast array of new electronic and communications products recently
made available will likely underestimate output growth, perhaps by
enough to account for the missing productivity. The second explanation
centers on the possibility that the short-term disinflationary monetary
policies of the 1980s, which significantly increased real long-term interest
rates, may have turned businesses’ research focus to short-term R&D
with immediate payoffs, at the expense of longer-term, more uncertain
research.
CROSS-COUNTRY VARIATIONS IN NATIONAL ECONOMIC
GROWTH RATES: THE ROLE OF ~’TECHNOLOGY"
J. Bradford De Long’s paper attempts to explain two striking
observations about the cross-country distributions of living standards
and growth. The first is that the cross-country disparity of per capita real
incomes has increased markedly over the past two centuries. The second
is that the growth rates of real income in individual countries seem to be
converging to the pace that is consistent with their rates of investment
and population growth (as documented in the work of Ball, Mankiw, and
Romer 1988).
Broadly construed, De Long’s explanation works as follows. He
notes that the countries that were relatively poor 200 years ago are
relatively poor today, and those that were relatively rich 200 years ago
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is increasing. According to the neoclassical model, if each country had
started with somewhat different endowments of labor, capital, and
materials but had access to the same technology, then over long spans
of time, all countries would approach the same level of real per capita
income. The long-run divergence of incomes argues against this simple
case. If, however, the rich countries enjoy amplified effects of technology
improvements on standards of living, while poor countries do not, then
we will not observe even a gradual convergence of living standards.
De Long’s paper identifies two novel sources of income divergence,
each of which rests on a magnified long-run effect of productivity on real
per capita income for richer countries. The first source is the strong
endogeneity of population growth with respect to productivity and
income. Countries with high productivity and thus high real incomes
tend to have lower population growth rates. De Long shows that, for
the United States, each tripling in real per capita GDP is associated with
a I percentage point fall in the annual rate of population growth. De Long
suggests several explanations for this pattern. More prosperous countries
are often more educated countries, and better-educated women demand
better birth control; in poor countries, the average number of years of
schooling is low, and children are more valuable to production there
because they can be put to work at an earlier age. In other words, children
in poor countries are "investment goods" rather than "consumption
goods," as they are in rich countries. Other things equal, then, a country
that experiences rapid growth through increasing productivity will
experience lower population growth that will, in turn, raise income per
capita.
The second magnification effect arises from the endogeneity of the
relative price of capital. Prosperous countries tend to benefit from a low
relative price for investment goods. Most wealthy countries have
achieved their prosperity largely through attaining high levels of manu-
facturing productivity. This achievement implies a relatively low price
for manufactured goods, including the investment equipment that firms
use to produce more goods. In support of the negative correlation
between prosperity and the price of capital, De Long notes that the real
purchasing power of domestic currency in foreign markets can be as
much as eight times higher in rich countries than in poor countries. The
disparity in real purchasing power directly reflects the difference between
the relative price of easily traded goods, such as physical capital, in richer
and poorer countries. This negative correlation between prosperity and
the price of capital also magnifies the effects on real incomes of changes
in productivity: As productivity and real incomes rise, investment goods
become cheaper, and the economy can afford more investment goods for
a given pool of savings, thus affording further increases in productivity.
De Long shows that the combined effect of these productivity
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of a productivity increase on the steady-state level of output is orders of
magnitude larger than simple growth accounting would suggest. These
important endogeneities between income, population growth, and phys-
ical investment could go a long way toward explaining the extreme
divergence in national incomes that we have observed over the past two
centuries.
Thus, De Long concludes that technology, broadly defined as differ-
ences in productivity, explains much of the disparity in standards of
living across countries. He notes, however, that technology, narrowly
defined as the possession of the most modern machinery and manufac-
turing processes by a particular country, explains relatively little of the
differences in per capita incomes across countries. He cites work by Clark
(1987) that shows remarkable differences in output per hour in cotton
textiles across countries in the early twentieth century, even though many
of these countries used exactly the same textile machinery. The McKinsey
Global Institute’s study (1993) of cross-country productivity differences
reveals similar puzzles: Japan appears to be 47 percent more productive
than the United States in steel manufacture, but 67 percent less produc-
tive in food processing. It seems unlikely that Japan is adept at using and
refining the best manufacturing procedures for steel manufacture, yet is
completely inept at "learning and developing technologies for making
frozen fish."
Reacting to De Long’s observation concerning the link between
income and population growth, Jeffrey Frankel points out that "a prime
motive in poor countries for having many children is that they provide
the only form of insurance against destitution in old age." As a country
develops, its financial institutions develop with it, and the increased
accessibility of savings instruments can substitute for a high ratio of
children to working-age population as a savings plan.
Frankel also observes that De Long’s hypothesis about the endoge-
neity of both population growth and the price of investment goods
suggests a timing test: Under De Long’s interpretation, one ought to see
significant decreases in population growth or increases in investment
rates following surges in real growth. Frankel finds little evidence in the
data for East Asian countries that declines in population growth are more
likely to follow peak growth rates than to precede them. Investment rates
follow peak growth rates in some cases, perhaps confirming De Long’s
hypothesis. However, the data also show large increases in investment
thaf predate the peak in growth rates and could, thus, be considered the
proximate cause of subsequent growth, contrary to De Long’s interpre-
tation.
Frankel ends by noting De Long’s omission of a critical determinant
of differences in growth across countries: openness to trade and invest-
ment. A large body of empirical work finds openness to be an important
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lation. The economies that have converged are those that are open,
whether across the OECD, across Europe, or within the United States. The
reason, according to Frankel, is that "openness is how countries absorb
the best technology from the leaders," whether we construe technology
narrowly, as in the most up-to-date machinery and equipment, or more
broadly, to include managerial and organizational techniques. In addi-
tion, openness to trade is part of a self-reinforcing pattern of growth:
Countries that open their boundaries to trade grow more, but countries
that have grown also tend to lower tariffs and promote trade.
Adam Jaffe presents cross-country evidence supporting the effect of
income on population growth. Real per capita income and population
growth exhibit a strong negative correlation, with an increase in per
capita income from $1,000 to $10,000 associated with a decline in pop-
ulation growth from 2.5 percent per year to 1.5 percent. Of course, the link
between income and population growth is partly mechanical: As popu-
lation grows, holding income constant, per capita income must fall. But
Jaffe shows that the strength of the correlation could not arise exclusively
from this mechanical relationship. Suppose two countries begin with the
same per capita income, but the population of one grows at 1.5 percent
while the other grows at 2.5 percent. The low-population-growth country
will reach an income 10 times the rapid-population-growth country only
after 156 years! It is plausible, therefore, that much of the cross-section
variation in income and population growth rates arises because high
income causes low population growth, and not vice versa.
Jaffe suggests that the negative relationship between real income and
population growth is not continuous. The correlation falls substantially
for incomes above the median, and vanishes for countries with per capita
incomes above $10,000. Thus, the returns (measured in lower population
growth) to higher income appear to cease above this threshold income
level. This observation alters De Long’s story somewhat. Once the one-
time demographic threshold is crossed, no further population growth
effect would occur for the rich country.
Jaffe also clarifies the explanation for the observed correlation
between income and the price of investment goods. Productivity im-
provements must (by definition) make goods and services cheaper.
Because most of the productivity enhancements of the past century have
been concentrated in manufactured goods, the real price of manufactured
goods has fallen faster than the real price of services. As investment is
likely to draw more heavily on manufactured goods than on services, the
relative price of investment goods will also fall as productivity rises. The
importance of this observation is that the apparent feedback between
income and the price of investment goods can arise from productivity
increases in an autarkic country, and thus does not depend upon foreign
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currency and growth simply reflects underlying differences in produc-
tivity improvements across countries.
Finally, Jaffe questions the usefulness of a debate over which inputs
to production should be labeled "technology." Echoing comments made
by a number of participants during the conference, Jaffe finds it more
useful to expand the list of potential explanations of differences in growth
across regions and sectors. He suggests that a deeper understanding of
the importance of hardware, software, human capital, ideas, and institu-
tional and market factors in production may help us better explain
differences in productivity and growth.
ADDRESS: JOB INSECURITY AND TECHNOLOGY
Alan Greenspan’s address focuses on human reactions to the
structural changes caused by modern computer and telecommunications
technologies. Pointing to the paradoxical pervasiveness of insecurity and
malaise in a period of extended economic growth, restrained inflation,
and a comparatively low layoff rate, he examines the origins of this
anxiety and suggests ways of alleviating it.
He sees modern societies as having evolved from a time when the
creation of economic value depended on physical brawn and physical
product to the present when ideas are the critical input. This accelerating
trend has had two important consequences: It has played a major role in
changing the distribution of income in this country, and it has created a
sense of foreboding in a large part of the work force.
Expanding on the first outcome, Greenspan explains that as ideas
have become critical to the creation of economic value, education and
intellectual skill have become increasingly important determinants of
earned income. Although the supply of college graduates rose with
demand in the 1960s and 1970s, by the 1980s the demand for skilled
workers was apparently outstripping supply. The seeming result was a
rise in the compensation of college graduates relative to that of less-
educated individuals. Because the growth in real incomes slowed mark-
edly in the mid 1970s--reflecting a similar (and not fully explicable)
slowdown in productivity growth--widening income disparity has
meant that parts of the work force have experienced stagnant or falling
real incomes and understandably feel rooted to a treadmill.
Greenspan suspects that an even larger share of the work force is
suffering from the job insecurity caused by rapid technological change.
This group, composed of relatively skilled, experienced, and well-paid
individuals who interact closely with our high-tech capital stock, are
acutely aware of the speed at which this stock is being radically
transformed. As a consequence, they fear that their own job skills may
suddenly become obsolete. Greenspan suggests that these fears have led
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security over wage hikes, lengthening labor contracts, and unusually
subdued strike activity.
Given widespread recognition of the growing income disparity,
labor’s acquiescence is somewhat surprising. Still, the relative economic
welfare of low-income workers may not have deteriorated as much as
the rising disparities in the distribution of income and wealth suggest.
For example, recent work by Johnson and Shipp (1996) finds that the
rise in consumption inequality since 1981 is only three-quarters as large
as the rise in income inequality. Since purchases of consumer durables
provide services throughout their useful lifetimes and are more akin
to investments, the distribution of consumer durables deserves special
attention.
Since 1982, household ownership of consumer durables has grown
at an annual average rate of 3.3 percent a year, a slightly faster rate than
in the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, according to data provided by
Stephanie Shipp and her colleagues at the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
while ownership of consumer durables clearly rises with income, the
distribution of ownership rates across income groups for cars and many
appliances actually became more equal between 1980 and 1994. By
exception, the disparity in ownership rates for personal computers
remains large--unfortunately, given that knowledge of computers is
linked to economic success.
Stressing that economic security depends on much more than
owning selected consumer durables, Greenspan argues that the solution
to the malaise created by rapid technological change involves finding
ways to enhance skills. Since education has clearly become a lifetime
activity, it is fortunate that many companies are beginning to see that
human capital development is crucially important to improving profit-
ability and shareholder value. He hopes that this approach will also help
to reduce income disparities.
While the twenty-first century is likely to remain just as fast-paced
as the recent past, Greenspan concludes, individuals currently entering
the work force are used to rapid change and many six-year-olds are
computer literate. Thus, as in previous periods of great structural change,
the current frictions and uncertainties will diminish as people learn to
adapt.
MICROECONOMIC POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
Reviewing the impact of public policies towards R&D spending,
patents, and competition on innovation, Edwin Mansfield argues that
government has a major influence on the rate of technological change in
major industries. He points out that the federal government finances
about 35 percent of all U.S. R&D investment and 60 percent of the R&D
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these expenditures. First, where government is the primary purchaser of
public goods, like national defense or space exploration, the government
clearly bears primary responsibility for promoting related technological
change. In addition, much federal R&D is directed towards basic research
because market failures or spillovers could cause private sector invest-
ment to fall short of socially optimal levels.
However, it is not self-evident that R&D spending is actually sub-
optimal. In many oligopolistic markets, product improvement is a major
form of competition. As a result, R&D spending might actually exceed
socially desirable levels in such industries. In addition, the government
currently subsidizes R&D activities through the R&D tax credit and
various grant programs. Thus, the government may already have offset
any tendency for the economy to underinvest in R&D.
To address this issue, Mansfield reviews empirical estimates of the
social rate of return from innovation, a body of work to which he has
made major contributions. He starts by showing that the social benefits
from an innovation equal the sum of the gains to consumers from the
resulting decline in prices and society’s resource saving (alternatively, the
innovator’s profit). Arguing that a high social rate of return signals a
productive investment, Mansfield reports that empirical studies consis-
tently find the median social rate of return from innovation to be
substantial (the lowest median cited was 56 percent), even when private
returns were low or negative.
The gap between the social and private rates of return from innova-
tion provides an important rationale for government support of civilian
technology. But, while a remarkable number of independent studies find
the gap between marginal social and private rates of return to be sizable,
many economists suspect that federal intervention could do more harm
than good. Accordingly, Mansfield offers guidelines for public R&D
support programs. First, given the huge uncertainty surrounding R&D
outcomes, government incentives should remain modest, encourage
parallel approaches, and provide information for appraising the desir-
ability of further support. Such programs should not aid declining
industries or late-stage development work. Recommending a pluralistic,
decentralized approach, Mansfield also suggests that potential users
of new technologies play a role in project selection so that public R&D
efforts reflect market realities.
Mansfield’s paper then reviews the pros and cons of another
important instrument of national technology policy, the patent system.
Some supporters argue that patent protection provides necessary incen-
tives for innovation and development activities by slowing the intro-
duction of relatively low-risk, low-cost copycat products. Other propo-
nents assert that the patent filing process actually speeds the disclosure
and dissemination of new technologies. Critics complain that the pa-
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olies that slow the spread of new information. Still others conclude that
patents have minimal importance, especially for large corporations; firms
keep secret what inventions they can, they say, and patent those they
cannot.
Turning again to empirical results, Mansfield reports that while
patent protection does not make entry impossible or even unlikely, it
does raise the cost of imitation. According to one study by Mansfield,
Schwartz, and Wagner (1981), patenting raised the median imitation cost
by 11 percent--30 percent in ethical drugs and 7 percent in electronics.
Despite widespread skepticism about the value of the patent system,
Mansfield acknowledges that few economists would recommend abol-
ishing it, given our limited understanding of its impact.
Mansfield’s paper ends with a discussion of the effects of market
structure and antitrust policy. He concludes that while market entrants
often play an important role in promoting technological change, some
R&D activities exhibit economies of scale. Since a complementary mix of
firm sizes appears to benefit technological change, public policy should
aim to eliminate unnecessary barriers to entry and discourage industrial
concentration.
The theme of Samuel Kortum’s comments is that the effectiveness Of
government technology policy depends crucially on the responsiveness
of technological change to research effort, and that the evidence about the
actual impact of research activity on innovation is weak. Although a vast
literature has uncovered a systematic relationship between growth of
total factor productivity and research effort (R&D/sales), Kortum points
out that these studies provide no evidence °concerning the direction of
causality in this relationship.
Kortum raises the provocative possibility that technological change
may be largely impervious to government incentives--if, for instance,
innovation is an exogenous process more dependent on the chance ar-
rival of technological opportunities than on incentives to exploit them--
and sets out to show that this idea is not so easy to disprove. To do so,
he develops a model in which R&D spending is the means by which
firms compete for patent rights to h~novations that arise within the
econ.omy regardless of the level of research activity. The larger a firm’s
share of industry spending on R&D, the greater is the probability that
it will win patent rights valued at the industry’s cost savings from the
innovation. If the above model describes the real world, a cross-industry
estimation of the impact of R&D effort on total factor productivity will
reflect the fact that R&D effort depends on the value of exogenous
innovation.
In Kortum’s model with exogenous technical change, the private rate
of return to R&D is the interest rate, but the social rate of return is -100
percent since the marginal expenditure has no benefit for society. Even
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as well as winning firms in calculating the social rate of return on R&D,
are likely to find huge social payoffs--erroneously if innovation is
actually exogenous. Although Mansfield and his coauthors state that
social benefits should be measured only between the date when the
innovation occurred and the date when it would have appeared if the
innovator had done nothing, Kortum ques.tions the validity of survey
work based on hypothetical questions about the timing of competitors’
innovations.
To provide additional evidence as to whether innovation is endog-
enous or exogenous, Kortum recommends careful analysis of the impact
of a specific policy change, like the increased patent protection stemming
from the 1983 creation of a single appellate court for patent cases. If
technological change is actually exogenous, then such a policy shift
should have no impact on productivity. By contrast, evidence that the
policy action raised productivity would be highly suggestive of endoge-
nous technological change.
Joshua Lerner focuses his comments on Mansfield’s policy prescrip-
tions. In particular, he asks whether technology policy should recognize
that small firms generate a disproportionately large share of major in-
novations, since, as Mansfield and others have pointed out, many studies
find that start-ups play a big role in applying radical technologies.
Although key innovations are usually developed with federal funds at
universities or research labs, small firms are often the first to act upon the
commercial possibilities. As important examples of this phenomenon,
Lerner cites the development of biotechnologies and the Internet. Given
the uncertain path of technical developments and the critical role often
played by previously unknown firms, Lerner is skeptical of Mansfield’s
stress on a "proper coupling between technology and the market" and
his prescription that federal R&D be directed with the advice of potential
users.
Lerner next addresses issues raised by the patent system, particularly
the impact of the single court of appeals for patent cases established in
1983. Lerner argues that the new court has produced more pro-patent
rulings than the previous system--with the result that large and small
firms are putting more effort into seeking new and defending old patent
protection. Viewed broadly, Lerner contends, the consequent growth in
patent litigation has created a substantial "innovation tax" that falls
particularly hard on small firms. In a recent research effort Lerner (1985)
has found that patent litigation begun in 1991 will lead to total legal
expenditures amounting to more than one-quarter of the private dollars
spent on basic research; the indirect costs of this litigation are also
substantial. Survey results suggest that these costs are a more important
deterrent to development efforts for small firms than for large firms.
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actually discouraged entry. Lerner is concerned that efforts to make
federal research commercially relevant could have the same effect.
TECHNOLOGY IN U.So MANUFACTURING:
THE GEOGRAPHIC DIMENSION
Continuing with a micro perspective, Jane Sneddon Little and
Robert K. Triest explore the process by which advanced technology
enters general use. Using relatively new data from the U.S. Census
Bureau’s Surveys of Manufacturing Technology (SMTs) for 1988 and 1993
(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1989 and 1994), their paper examines
variations in the adoption of 17 advanced technologies across the nation
and within individual states. The authors consider a variety of plant and
locational characteristics that might raise the probability of technology
use, but they are particularly interested in whether proximity to firms
already using advanced technologies fosters adoption. Proximity to early
users might affect adoption decisions by reducing the perceived risk and
actual cost of investing in this new equipment.
Little and Triest estimate a set of econometric models that control for
the effects of plant, firm, and locational characteristics. As measures of
technology diffusion, the authors examine the change in the number of
advanced technologies used by SMT establishments between 1988 and
1993, the number of technologies used in 1993, and the probability of
adopting a particular technology by specified dates covered by the SMT
survey. In each case, the authors first control only for proximity to other
users of advanced technologies. They then add in a set of plant and firm
characteristics, such as size and industry. As a final step, they include a
set of locational characteristics, like educational attainment of the work
force, in the group of explanatory variables. In all three estimations,
proximity to early users almost always has an economically and statisti-
cally significant positive effect on technology adoption, not only when
proximity is the only explanatory variable but also when plant charac-
teristics are taken into account. While introducing locational characteris-
tics always reduces the coefficient on proximity, these coefficients still
remain positive and statistically significant in the equations for the
number of technologies used in 1993 and for the change in number of
technologies used. By contrast, for the models estimating the probability
of adopting specific technologies over a span of years, the proximity
variable generally loses its significance when the geographic variables are
added.
Little and Triest conclude that proximity to other users of advanced
tectmologies is associated with higher rates of adoption, even when
industry and other plant characteristics are controlled. They find this
result noteworthy since, with its well-developed communications net-
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United States might be expected to approach the limiting case of
immediate, costless diffusion of technology. Human capital appears to
be an important part of the proximity effect, they speculate, because,
among the locational variables, access to a work force with a high school
education or some technical training is associated with a higher rate of
technology adoption. Some of the remaining proximity effect may reflect
the impact of social interactions in spreading technical information.
Although the authors were not able to separate proximity/spillover
effects from the impact of educational attainment/university R&D to
their satisfaction, they believe that the evidence of uneven technology
diffusion warrants further research. Because technology adoption is
extremely expensive for individual firms and the nation, gaining a better
understanding of this process remains an important goal.
John Haltiwanger’s comments on the Little-Triest paper center on
his concerns about data and measurement issues and about the appro-
priate interpretation of their results. Citing recent research by Dunne and
Troske (1995), Haltiwanger points out that the answers to the retrospec-
tive questions in the 1993 SMT on the timing of technology adoption
appear subject to substantial recall bias. Respondents systematically date
adoption more recently than was actually the case. As a result, Halti-
wanger suggests, the Little-Triest variable measuring the change in the
number of technologies used may actually be a better measure of the
number of technologies in use in 1993. Thus, although Little and Triest
find some evidence of clustering, the timing problems raise questions
about the direction of causality and the underlying source of this
clustering.1
Dunne and Troske’s work raises another important issue, Haltiwan-
ger contends. Their 1995 study finds evidence of significant rates of
de-adoption for specific technologies. For example, for the matched
sample of plants responding to both the 1988 and 1993 SMTs, 39 percent
of the establishments using local area networks in 1988 were not using
them in 1993. This finding suggests additional measurement problems or
the intriguing possibility that firms experiment with new technologies
that they eventually decide not to use. If so, a region that is relatively slow
to de-adopt should not be labeled "advanced," Haltiwanger suggests.
Haltiwanger then takes up a line of argument similar to that raised
by Samuel Kortum: Does the adoption of advanced technologies actually
affect outcomes we really care about--the growth of income or
1 In response to Haltiwanger’s comments concerning their use of retrospective data,
Little and Triest reran their regressions using the subsample of firms responding to both the
1988 and 1993 SMTs. Relying on current rather than retrospective data on technology use
did not change the flavor of their results. If anything, the change strengthens the impression
that proximity affects technology adoption. See Little and Triest, footnote 43, in this volume,
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employment or productivity? While one might presume such a connec-
tion, work by Doms, Dunne, and Troske (1995) suggests that differences
in technology use are not particularly meaningful. Although Doms,
Dunne, and Troske find that advanced technology use has a significant
positive effect on plant-level labor productivity, differences in technology
adoption account for only 1 percent of the total variation in labor
productivity across plants. Moreover, these authors find no statistically
significant link between technology adoption and the growth in plant-
level labor productivity. (Perhaps the failure of micro studies to find
much connection between the adoption of new technologies and produc-
tivity levels or growth should not be so surprising, given our similar
inability to find any productivity payoff to vast investments in new
technologies at the macro level.)
Alluding to research stressing the dominance of idiosyncratic factors
and the importance of the reallocation process steering resources from
less to more productive plants, Haltiwanger suggests caution in inter-
preting empirical results concerning technology diffusion. Seemingly, the
growth process is noisy and complex, and the required resource reallo-
cation is time-consuming.
In commenting on the Little-Triest paper, George Hatsopoulos
provides the perspective of his many years of experience in managing
high-technology companies. He interprets proximity as representing local
management culture or standard technological practice within a given
area. In this context he finds that the authors’ conclusions correspond
with his own observations.
Hatsopoulos starts by emphasizing tl~e relative importance of diffu-
sion-compared with innovation--in determining a country’s technolog-
ical sophistication. Like Johi~ Haltiwanger, he also finds that intangibles
like managerial and organizational skills, and labor-management rela-
tions, exert an extremely important influence on micro and macro
productivity levels.
Turning to Little and Triest’s empirical results concerning the impact
of proximity on the probability of technology adoption, Hatsopoulos
reports that this finding matches his observation that decisions about
the use of specific technologies are determined by middle managers and
foremen who, in turn, are heavily influenced by prevailing practice at
neighboring plants. To illustrate this point, he cites the example of two
plants, one in Manchester, England and one in Auburn, Massachusetts.
Although the two were making identical products for the paper industry,
labor productivity in Manchester was about half that in Auburn. The
problem, it turned out, was that managers and workers in Manchester
were extremely reluctant to import manufacturing and organizational
technologies that headquarters had found useful in the United States but
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influenced by local practice, Thermo-Ele~tron had a very hard time trying
to change their behavior.
Reacting to Little and Triest’s finding that plant size has a significant
positive impact on technology adoption while firm size does not, Hat-
sopoulos indicates that these relationships again app6ar intuitively plau-
sible to him since plant scale must be considered in making technology
decisions while access to capital, a firm-level characteristic, has only an
indirect impact on local technology choices. Similarly, Hatsopoulos
reports that he is not particularly puzzled by the result that access to a
work force with a high school education has a greater impact on the
probability of tecku~ology adoption than does access to workers with a
college education. Because he finds the importance of foremen and other
middle managers to be of overriding importance in the technology
decision, Hatsopoulos finds this result matches his expectations.
MACRO POLICY, INNOVATION, AND LONG-TERM
GROWTH: A PANEL DISCUSSION
Martin Baily begins by dissecting potential GDP growth, estimated
to be 2.3 percent per year, into its major components: labor inputs, which
have been rising about 1.1 percent annually; and labor productivity,
which has shown trend growth of 1.1 percent per year since 1973. As
Baily points out, while trend labor productivity has fallen from its 2.9
percent average in the 1960-73 period, the explicable part of productivity
growth (the part due to capital intensity, education and experience, and
R&D) has been remarkably constant at 1.1 percent since 1960. By contrast,
the unexplained residual, the productivity "bonus" enjoyed between 1960
and 1973, has entirely disappeared; "We did not know where it came
from then, and now we do not know where it has gone." In a related
puzzle, the growing gap between the annual earnings of college and of
high school graduates is widely attributed to a rising demand for
technically skilled workers, but we see no signs of major technological
breakthroughs in the productivity numbers. More formally, we see
evidence of technological bias in the increased return to education but no
evidence of technological change in measured productivity growth.
Turning to policy prescriptions, Baily concludes that current growth
rates reflect supply rather than demand constraints and, thus, that the
potential role for monetary policy in spurring growth is limited. By
contrast, fiscal policy is important: During the .1980s the federal budget
deficit was a primary cause of our low rates of saving and investment,
which in turn contributed to the deceleration in capital intensity and
productivity growth. Thus, reducing the federal deficit remains an
important policy goal. A second area for policy action relates to education
and training. Although the contribution to productivity growth made by
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the growing experience of the aging baby boom generation, and the rising
return to education suggests that the demand for highly skilled workers
continues to outstrip supply. Because Alan Krueger’s work (1993) shows
that computer skills in particular are linked to higher wages and,
presumably, thus, to higher productivity, federal seed money for com-
puter literacy programs might prove especially helpful. Finally~ since
studies by Edwin Mansfield and others suggest that the social return to
private R&D is substantial, Baily concludes that tax incentives for R&D
could play a positive role. Moreover, since private R&D appears corre-
lated with prior federal R&D spending, Baily is concerned about congres-
sional proposals to curtail the rate of public non-defense research.
Baily ends by speculating about the unexplained growth bonus
enjoyed between 1960 and 1973. Much of that spurt in productivity
growth may have resulted from a burst of innovation and a shift from
craft to mass production that cannot be repeated. If so, we may simply
have to adjust to a world with lower productivity growth and slower
growth in average real wages--a world split into winners and losers.
Such a world would require attention to policy dimensions such as the
provision of safety nets, Baily submits. On the other hand, because
measuring output and productivity is extremely difficult, particularly in
areas like health care, or in retailing and financial services where
convenience is important, output and productivity growth may actually
be better than we think. Accordingly, Baily advocates investing in, not
starving, our statistical agencies in order to get better data and better
policies. Finally, maintaining open economies and deregulating domestic
markets provide important incentives to adopting better technologies.
Ralph Gomory addressed his remarks to the impact of economic
development in technically backward countries on welfare in the indus-
trialized nations, a topic of great concern to many policymakers. As
underdeveloped countries improve their technical capabilities, they be-
come significant contributors to world output, but they also become more
effective competitors to established industries in developed nations. What
is the net impact on the national welfare of the technically advanced
nations? To analyze this issue, Gomory offers a classical Ricardian model
of international trade in which the relative efficiencies determining com-
parative advantage are allowed to vary, as in Gomory and Baumol (1995a).
Gomory sketches a two-country model--or rather a family of
two-country models--that assumes single-input linear production func-
tions, Cobb-Douglas utilities, and fixed labor supplies and demand
parameters, as well as a fixed number of industries. In equilibrium, both
countries actively participate in a given industry only if their unit labor
costs in that industry are equal. The exercise then calculates, for all
possible values of average labor productivity, the equilibrium outcome in
terms of national utility and share of world income for each country.
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two countries because, even though world output is greatest when both
countries have similar productivities and split world production 50-50,
the best outcome for each one singly occurs when it has a large share of
world output and income; this point always represents a poor result for
the other. As Gomory carefully points out, improvements in productivity
in one country (which always increase that country’s share of world
income) sometimes enhance welfare in both countries; however, in other
cases, unilateral improvements in productivity decrease the welfare of
the other.
What conditions determine the outcome? Assuming, as in Gomory
and Baumol, that efficiency rises in an active industry and decays in a less
active industry, the model suggests a natural tendency for national shares
of world output to remain close to their original values, while incomes
expand as a result of improving efficiencies. However, if one country
(generally the lower-wage country) succeeds by policy measures in
"capturing" a growing share of world output in a given industry, its
welfare improves. Whether or not welfare improves in the second
(advanced) country depends on whether the depressing effect of the
capture is or is not outweighed by improved efficiencies (via learning-
by-doing, for instance) in all other industries. This result contrasts with
Ricardo’s original insight that trade based on comparative advantage
determined by a specific pair of production functions always enhances
well-being in both countries.
Abel Mateus’s experiences with the Banco de Portugal and the
World Bank permit him to examine the impact of macro policies on
growth from the perspective of developing as well as developed econo-
mies. He suggests that technological progress is a primary determinant of
growth in developed countries, whereas in developing countries most
growth is due to the accumulation of physical and human capital that
incorporates ideas transferred from advanced nations; thus, in these
developing countries, outward orientation is complementary to the
capital accumulation process.
Mateus points out that in small open economies "miraculous"
growth is linked with rapid accumulation of human capital and use of
that knowledge to operate physical capital to produce goods near the
country’s technological frontier. Shifting labor and capital to ever more
advanced activities allows learning by doing and augments the accumu-
lation of human capital. Export orientation is essential to such a growth
strategy because this approach creates a gap between the mix of goods
consumed domestically and the mix of goods produced and by necessity
exported to larger, more demanding foreign markets. By contrast, Eastern
Europe provides counterexamples of countries where the technology gap
is sufficiently huge that trade promotes so much Schumpeterian (cre-
ative?) destruction that short-term welfare actually declines. Neverthe-
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pursue the painful path of institutional change, industrial restructuring,
and integration into the world trading system. Moreover, most develop-
ing countries, with smaller initial manufacturing sectors, do not face such
conflicts; for them, the benefits of trade based on comparative advantage
apply even in the short run. The policy implications stemming from
Mateus’s observations of small open economies include an emphasis on
formal education, protection of property rights, and an export-oriented
trade stance to promote competition and technology transfer.
Mateus then addresses the impact of free trade in goods and
technologies on the developed countries, where these developments have
been associated in the 1980s and 1990s with high unemployment rates
and stagnant or declining rea~ wages for unskilled workers. After a
reminder that present levels of global integration are not unprecedented,
he points to the drop in transportation costs and the inff~ease in
communication speeds as the truly new elements. Although he sees some
evidence supporting Paul Krugman’s (1981) hypothesis that these devel-
opments will improve the lot of peripheral regions at the expense of the
core and Jagdish Bhagwati’s finding that comparative advantage has
become "kaleidoscopic," moving almost at random across developed
countries, he finally concurs with Obstfeld (1994) that financial integra-
tion, with investment shifting from lower-return to higher-return
projects, can yield substantial welfare gains throughout the world via its
effect on output and consumption growth.
Because the profitability of innovation and diffusion depends in part
on the macro environment, Mateus then turns to fiscal policy and
suggests that a high and rising debt ratio is likely to lower the long-term
rate of growth. He cites World Bank findings that a 1 percentage point
increase in the government surplus as a percent of GDP raises per capita
growth by 0.37 percent and the investment ratio by 0.24 percent. Other
research suggests that debt ratios and budget deficits are positively
associated with increases in long-term risk premia. Mateus concludes,
thus, that the near doubling in gross public debt as a share of GDP
between the 1970s and the mid 1990s has had a significant negative
impact on European growth rates. Accordingly, Mateus recommends
wider use of consumption-based tax systems and a significant cut in the
size of the public sector, to be accomplished, in part, through better
project and activity evaluations. In addition, Mateus warns, social secu-
rity systems in most countries are unsustainable.
Mateus ends by reprising his major policy recommendations. First,
the emphasis on economic stability, trade liberalization, market-oriented
policies, and human capital accumulation long advocated by interna-
tional organizations appears to be appropriate. Second, the potential for
improving world welfare by technology diffusion and portfolio diversi-
fication is enormous. Finally, within the developed world, blaming
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misguided. In Europe, reducing high rates of unemployment requires
improving labor market flexibility, while in North America dealing with
the plight of unskilled workers awaits more adequate redistributive
policies.
Robert Solow expressed relief that the panel was discussing whether
macro (not monetary) policy can promote long-term growth; as phrased,
the question implies that fiscal policy is available for the task--luckily,
since monetary policy cam~ot possibly address the many goals often
assigned to it. Solow then begins his policy recommendations by urging
advocates--academics as well as politicians--to stop making inflated
claims for their favorite policy tools. The flat tax, a cut in the capital gains
tax, and various labor market reforms may or may not be good ideas, but
their impact on growth is likely to range from negligible to small--at
most. In particular, Solow chides, too many theorists have taken to
fabricating powerful policy options by leaping from empirically estab-
lished links between levels to assumed links between levels and growth
rates. For example, while most would agree that the level of human
capital affects the level of output, too many go on to assume that a high
level of schooling will increase the growth of human capital, or that a high
level of R&D will speed the pace of innovation. With these assumptions,
tax policy can readily be shown to affect the permanent rate of economic
growth since it is quite easy to design incentives for schooling or R&D.
"But do we really know that an increase in schooling or R&D will
generate more than a one-time shift in the level of output?" the self-
described spoilsport asks.
This plea for circumspection limits the list of growth-promoting
policies severely, Solow admits. Still, he considers certain commonplaces
worth repeating. Given how little we know about the links between
stocks and growth rates, any policy that raises potential output perma-
nently should be described as contributing to growth--even if the
long-term rate of growth remains unchanged. Just shifting the steady-
state growth path upward, parallel to itself, is a major feat, he contends.
After warning that the trade-offs between growth and current living
standards must be weighed, he emphasizes that anyone choosing growth
must favor investment over consumption. Since a pro-saving policy need
not be pro-investment (because additional saving may reduce a current
account deficit rather than raise investment, say), Solow proposes com-
bining improved incentives to save with policies that shift the composi-
tion of demand in favor of investment. Any fiscal stance, he reminds us,
can be weighted in favor of investment, with tax-and-subsidy policy an
obvious instrument. Similarly, while a given macro posture can be
achieved with many combinations of monetary and fiscal ease and
tightness, in general growth is efficiently served by mixing relatively tight
fiscal policy, to promote national saving, with relatively easy monetary
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Solow also endorses a macro strategy that guides total demand
toward potential whenever a gap between the two appears--for many
reasons, but not least because this policy is growth promoting. He notes
in this context that actual demand tends to fall below potential somewhat
more often than it exceeds it, and that prospects for weak and fluctuating
demand discourage investment. While the impact of modest overheating
(particularly on investment volumes) is less clear, he cites consensus
views that price stability encourages the most productive allocation of
capital. Solow ends by asking, tentatively, if the Fed could usefully
conduct open market operations at all maturities, not just at the short end,
in order to affect long rates which, presumably, are the most relevant for
investment decisions.
Moderator Richard Cooper initiated the general discussion by
remarking that over the last 50 years, the process of innovation has, for
the first time, become institutionalized and by asking the panelists and
conferees to consider the price of future growth in terms of current
income. Would it have been moral to ask our grandparents to save more
in order that we could be even better off, compared with them, than we
already are? In response, Robert Solow replied that he would be less
concerned about growth if we were better at income redistribution, but,
since we find redistribution hard, increasing today’s growth is one way to
help today’s poor children and today’s poor countries. Baily and Mateus
added that public and private myopia about looming retirement needs
requires current policy action to spur saving. Other comments addressed
the differential impact of environmental spending on measured produc-
tivity and the quality of life, and the need to explore the impact of the
transitional costs of technological change on the growth process.
CONCLUSION
After two decades of research focusing on the source and stabiliza-
tion of short-run economic fluctuations, the profession has recently
returned to considering the determinants of long-run growth. This
resurgence in interest arises for several reasons. Many developed econ-
omies have seen their average growth rate halved since the mid 1970s,
and as yet we have no compelling explanation. Differences across
countries in standards of living and in growth rates are large and not
obviously shrinking, even as modern technology has been disseminated
more widely and educational standards have risen. The welfare implica-
tions of these cross-time and cross-country income differences dwarf
those that arise from business-cycle fluctuations.
One fruitful vein of research has striven to understand growth from
within the neoclassical framework, attributing continued increases in
income primarily to investments in physical and human capital. Dale
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and estimated set of econometric models in the neoclassical tradition. His
conclusion is that investment can account for the preponderance of
growth. This assessment is important, as it provides a benchmark for the
contribution of standard inputs to growth. And yet, as Susanto Basu
points out, the neoclassical model ultimately cannot plausibly explain all
of the differences in growth that we observe over time and across
countries. It seems extremely unlikely that we could have achieved most
of our high standard of living today simply by using more and more of
the investment goods that were prevalent in the nineteenth century. We
could not have arrived at our sophisticated communications-linked,
information-processed, efficiently manufactured state simply by using
more and more shovels, adding machines, and steam engines. And yet
the available data do not reveal a clear relationship between the inven-
tion, development, or adoption of new technology and subsequent im-
provements in productivity or income. Where does this observation leave
us? Participants in this conference generally agreed on a few tentative
conclusions.
First, it may be helpful to understand the input to production that is
neither human nor physical capital not simply as "technology," but as an
aggregate of the state of technology, organizational and managerial
ability, and "economic culture." These concepts are not easily measured,
but given the inability of relatively well-measured constructs to explain
the variation in productivity in disaggregated data, we must try to model
and measure these intangibles better if we are to understand significant
differences in growth and productivity over time and across countries.
Second, most conference participants agree that it is probably be-
yond our grasp to design policies that we can be confident will spur
specific innovations, or even spur innovation generally. The difficulty
arises largely from the tremendous amount of uncertainty that surrounds
the process of innovation. Given the difficulty in knowing which inno-
vations will succeed, when they will arise, and what complementary
innovations they will require to become "useful," policymakers do not
possess the foresight to tailor policies to foster specific innovations. Still,
most participants agreed that the social returns to innovation exceed the
private returns. Although the extent to which private returns spill over
into non-appropriable social returns is not clear, most would say such
spillovers are likely to be sizable. Thus, the government should play a
limited role in promoting R&D.
Finally, two dear insights from our panelists merit special attention
as pointers to future research. The first, highlighted by moderator
Richard Cooper, is that we assume, as a matter of default, that a higher
long-run growth rate is better. In doing so, we are implicitly choosing the
multiple by which our descendants’ welfare will exceed our own. At a 1
percent rate of annual productivity growth, our grandchildren will on
average have 65 percent higher real incomes than we do; at a 2 percent32 Jeffrey C. Fuhrer and Jane Sneddon Little
rate they will have nearly triple our real incomes. But in order to attain
these increases for our descendants, we must forgo some current con-
sumption. Cooper poses the question: How much better off should our
grandchildren be than we are, and at what cost? Robert Solow points out,
in response to Cooper’s question, that productivity-generated increases in
the size of the economic pie may benefit the poor children of today and
tomorrow. This question lies at the root of the discussions about produc-
tivity slowdowns and hoped-for improvements.
The second insight, articulated by Robert Solow, is a reminder that
not all improvements in welfare must be measured as changes in the
growth rate of the economy. One-time permanent improvements in the
level of potential output are also valuable and probably much more
attainable. The profession may do well to focus more of its attention on
policies that could more reliably achieve these less spectacular improve-
ments.
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